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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL TRIAL
EXAMINERS AND THE RAMSPECK CASE
CHARLES H. KINNANE

N

Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conerence,' decided

March 9, 1953, the Supreme Court made notable contributions
to an important area of federal administrative law. That area
relates to the important "administrative judiciary" or "independent
trial examiner" system provided by the Federal Administrative Pro1 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
DR. CHARLES HERMAN KINNANE, Professor of Law in De Paul University, died after
a brief illness on April 28, 1954. This article was completed shortly before Professor
Kinnane's death and reflects his provocative thinking on a controversial portion of the
FederalAdministrative Procedure Act. Proposals for amendment of the sections dealing with trial examiners were introduced in the 83d Congress, but no action was taken
and the problem is still under discussion and consideration.
Born in Linwood, Michigan, on September 4, 1898, Professor Kinnane interrupted
his student days at the University of Illinois to serve in Frane with the University
of Illinois Ambulance Unit. He returned to the University of Illinois after the war,
and was awarded the degrees of BS. and LL.B. in 1924. In 1926, be was awarded the

degree of J.S.D. by Yale University. The fifteen years after his graduation from law
school were spent in acquiring a wide experience in different fields of legal endeavor.
He bad several years of practice in Illinois and a year with the Home Owners Loan
Corporation.He taught in the University of Wyoming College of Law from 1924 to
1932, being the Dean after 1926; he then taught as a part-time teacher in Loyola University School of Law (Chicago) front 1932 to 1936, and be served as the Dean of the
University of San Francisco School of Law from 1936 to 1939. In 1939, be came to
De Paul University College of Law, where he spent the remainder of his career,except
for a leave of absence from 1943 to 1948, as an attorney in the Public Utilities Division
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Professor Kinnane's early interests in the law bad centered in legal history and resuited in the publication of "A First Book on Anglo-American Law" in 1932. The subject continued to engross him, and although new interests were forming, be wrote a
second edition which was published in 1952. The new interests just mentioned were
in the field of Administrative Law and came into being after his service in the Securities and Exchange Commission. He was greatly affected and influenced by what he
saw there of the administrativeprocess and came to regard this process as increasingly
important and necessary in national and local government activity. A year or so before
his death be had begun the collection of materials for a casebook on Administrative
Law.
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cedure Act of 1946.2 In settling a number of basic problems, the Court
sustained the Civil Service Commission in its controversy with individual and associated members of the federal trial examiner system;
but the settling involved extensive differences of opinion besides that
between the Commission and the examiners. The Court itself divided;
it reversed the two courts below;3 and there was also a division in the
Court of Appeals.4
A litigation so fertile of controversy at all levels, from the administrative to the highest judicial, would seem almost inevitably to involve
grave issues of law, or of policy, or both; and furthermore, the final
decision in such a case, while it terminates the particular litigation,
may well fail to end the controversy about the issues themselves,
especially when, as in the Ramspeck case, such issues involve interpretation of a highly ambiguous statute. In such a case the decision
might serve very effectively to precipitate a new controversy, in a
legislative as distinguished from a judicial environment, as to whether
the statute should be amended to implement the view which failed
to prevail in the Court. At any rate, it is proposed herein to evaluate
the decision with the objects primarily of (1) ascertaining what the
position of the federal trial examiner is, in the light of the Ramspeck
case decision, and (2) forming a judgment as to whether the statute
should be amended to change that position.
As a preliminary, it might be pointed out that the Administrative
Procedure Act provides for a limited, rather than universal, use of the
"independent" trial examiners provided for by that Act. In general
such trial examiners serve as presiding officers at hearings, and make
decisions, in cases where agency action is of such an important kind
that Congress has thought fit, in specific instances covered by other
statutes, to safeguard the interests of persons affected by such action
by requirements of opportunity for hearing and of decision on the
25

U.S.C.A. § 1001-1011

(1953).

3 Federal Trial Examiners Conference v. Ramspeck, 104 F. Supp. 734 (D.C.D.C.,
1952). Judgment affirmed July 16, 202 F. 2d 312 (App. D.C., 1952). The opinion of the

majority of the Supreme Court states that "The Court of Appeals affirmed in a short
per curiam opinion, one judge dissenting," and that the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 344 U.S. 853 (1952).
4 By implication the Supreme Court also sustained so much of an opinion of the
Attorney General as involved the point that the Civil Service Commission is to determine which federal trial examiners within a particular agency may be promoted.
See the citation in 5 U.S.C.A. § 1010, to 1951, 41 Op. Atty. Gen., February 23.
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basis of record of such hearing. 5 But even in such cases, the agency,
or one or more of its members, may preside and decide, to the complete exclusion of the trial examiner from both the hearing and decisional processes; and in rule-making and some licensing cases the trial
examiner, even though he presided at the hearing, may be excluded
from participating in the decision.
Nevertheless, there remain numerous important situations where,
if the agency or one or more of its members do not preside, the "independent" trial examiner must do so; and where he must in the first
instance decide the case, whether by initial or recommended decision.
Furthermore, practice reinforces law in this connection, for, as a matter of fact, the agency heads in many agencies seldom wish to preside
in person at such hearings. As Mr. Justice Minton pointed out, in his
opinion for the majority in the Ramspeck case, "These agencies have
such a volume of business, including cases in which a hearing is required, that the agency heads, the members of boards and commissions, can rarely preside over hearings in which evidence is required."6
Accordingly, while the agencies can exclude the trial examiners from
participation in the important kinds of cases mentioned, in practice
they often do not. The consequence is that in great numbers of cases
the trial examiner is an important participant, with important functions to perform, in the more important kinds of cases coming before
many important federal agencies.
A principal reason for the establishment of the "independent" trial
examiner system for such important cases, by the Administrative Procedure Act, is also mentioned in Mr. Justice Minton's opinion. He
5Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that "Where rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for any agency hearmng, the requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall apply. . . ." Section 5 uses the same
formula as is shown by the following: "In every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . .
(c) The same officers who preside at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 7
shall make the recommended decision or initial decision. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 7 requirements as to use of trial examiners to preside at hearings are applicable

"In hearings which section 4 or 5 requires to be conducted pursuant to this section. . . ." Section 8 requirements in regard to decisions, by trial examiners among
others, are applicable, "In cases in which a hearing is required to be conducted in conformity with section 7." Rule-making and adjudication (defined by the Act to include
licensing) not required by statute to be on the record after opportunity for agency
hearing, is not safeguarded by the foregoing provisions.
6 During the writer's period of service of about five years with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to mention a specific agency, the cases when the Commission

presided at such hearings were very few. This experience is believed to be typical
of what goes on in many agencies.
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wrote, "Many complaints were voiced against the actions of the hearing examiners, it being charged that they were mere tools of the
agencies concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making
their proposed findings of fact and recommendations."
The core of the problem in regard to subservience or independence
of trial examiners is to be found in the Section 7 provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act about presiding at hearings for the
making of records, 7 and in the Section 8 provisions in regard to decisions. The Congressional objective is indicated in the portion of Section 7 (a) which reads: "The functions of all presiding officers and
of officers participating in decisions in conformity with section 8 shall
be conducted in an impartial manner." If "impartial manner" means
anything, it seems to mean that the presiding and deciding officer is
not to be either the prosecuting agent of the agency at hearings, or
the mere mouthpiece of the agency as one of the parties to the case,
at decision time.
This requirement of impartiality by presiding officers, including
trial examiners, was not put into the Act merely as the expression of
a pious hope.' A partial and subservient examiner has a most dangerous power to shape the making of the record of the hearing to desired
ends;' and also, in any case involving a substantial conflict in the evidence, he has a similar power to make findings of fact in a way believed by him to be "politic," and thereby lay the foundations for
decisions by him having the same inestimable character. On the other
hand, the independent and impartial examiner may let the chips lie
where they ought, and in case the agency on review disagrees with
his findings or decision, put the burden on the agency, which is more
or less suspect of partiality in some cases, of justifying its disagreement with the examiner who, because of his independence, is indulged
more or less with the contrary presumption of impartiality.' 0
7 One of the more "horrible" examples of perversion by a trial examiner of the
process of record making at hearing is found in Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 109 F. 2d 9 (C.A. 7th, 1940). Not even removal of the overzealous
trial examiner by the Board could correct the harm he had done.
SSee also Lavery, Federal Administrative Law § 136 (1952) for the point that the
matter of provisions in regard to presiding officers was very fully considered by the
two judiciary committees, and for citations to references.
9 See for example, the Inland case, cited in note 7.
10 Logically, of course, if independence of judgment at the levels of either initial
or final decision were the sole advantage to be desired, a complete separation of the
prosecutive from the determinative function should have been provided. Suffice it
to say that Congress felt that other important advantages would be needlessly sacri-
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The reasons for impartiality, and for the independence that makes
impartiality possible, are, therefore, both substantial and pervasive.
To ensure the desired impartiality on the part of trial examiners in
particular, Congress provided that, in the important kinds of situations already mentioned, if authority to preside be delegated to a subordinate, the hearings should be presided over by "one or more
examiners appointed as provided in this Act."" No other kind of subordinate could be designated for such service. And it was in general
only the kind of examiner "appointed as provided in this Act" who
was eligible to make the initial or recommended decision-a decision
which could not be dispensed with by the agency.
With these matters of background in regard to trial examiner impartiality and independence in mind, we may now proceed to consider the presently crucial section of the Administrative Procedure
Act, namely section 11. This is the section of the Act which purports
to provide independence for the federal trial examiner. It is the section which was involved in the Ramspeck case. What, in fact, does
this section provide in the way of trial examiner independence?
In pertinent part, it provides:
Subject to the civil service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent
with this act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant
to sections 7 and 8 who shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable. .

.

. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are

employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) after opportunity for
hearing and upon the record thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation
prescribed by the Commission independently of agency recommendations and
ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923 as amended....12

To be noted: While the agencies may appoint their examiners, the
examiners are (1) made independent of the agency served in that
(a) their compensation is determined by a separate body, the Civil
Service Commission, and (b) the examiners are removable only for
ficed by such a complete separation, and accordingly it made the initial or recommended decisions of trial examiners subject to plenary review by the agency. See
Section 8 (a). As to decisions at the top level of the agency, without requiring separation of functions, see Section 5 (c); and on the advantages of preserving
at
level the "unitary process" see Carrow, The Background of Administrative Law
(1948), pages 35-36, 95, 96, 100, 108.
11 Administrative Procedure Act, S 7(a) (3); 5 U.S.C.A. S 1006 (a) (3) (1946). Emphasis added.
12 Emphasis

added.
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cause, not as determined by the agency served, but only as determined by the Civil Service Commission; and (2) the examiners are
protected against agency reprisals in the way of assignments to routine
or unimportant cases only, or in the way of withholding from them
any work assignments whatever, by a requirement of assignment of
cases in rotation.
At first glance, these provisions might appear to be ample to destroy agency power to coerce, or to entice, examiners into subservient
action. On the other hand they may go less far than they appear to
go. In any event they seem to leave unanswered more questions than
they clearly provide answers for. A few examples: What in fact is
the general status of the federal trial examiner? Is he a judge, or not?
Does he, or does he not, have life tenure? Are the examiners all of
one rank, as for example federal district court judges? If not, who
determines ranks, and who controls promotions, and increases in
compensation? Are the examiners entirely beyond the reach of
agency reprisals? Are they entirely relieved of temptation to curry
the favor of the agency they serve? Obviously, the answers to all
these questions will have a bearing on the matter of independence
and on the matter of the impartiality that trial examiner independence is designed to make possible. The Ramspeck case answers some
of these questions and suggests possible answers to others.
The action in that case was for a declaratory judgment that certain rules of the Civil Service Commission in regard to examiners
were invalid, and for an injunction to restrain enforcement of such
rules. The relief asked was granted in the District Court, which interpreted Section 11 as requiring:
(1) that hearing examiners employed by a particular federal administrative
agency must be placed in the same salary grade; (2) that a hearing examiner
may not be promoted from one salary grade to another within the same
agency; (3) that hearing examiners must be assigned to cases in mechanical
rotation without regard to the difficulty or importance of particular cases,
or the competence or experience of particular examiners; and (4) that the
employment of hearing examiners may not be terminated by reduction in
force procedures where there is lack of work or funds with which to pay
them. 13

In disagreeing on these matters, the Supreme Court made a number
of important observations about the general status of trial examiners.
It said:
13 This statement is from the majority opinion. 345 U.S. 128, 129 (1953).
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Congress intended to make hearing examiners "a special class of semiindependent subordinate hearing officers" by vesting control of their compensation, promotion, and tenure in the Civil Service Commission to a much
greater degree than in the case of other federal employees. . . . An examination of Section 11 shows that Congress retained the examiners as classified
Civil Service employees . . . "freed from the theretofore existing dependence
on agency ratings for their classification, but as so freed" the examiners were
specifically declared to be otherwise under the other provisions of the Classification Act of 1923, as amended (now the Classification Act of 1949 . . .).
...
The position of hearing examiner is not a constitutionally protected position. It is a creature of congressional enactment. . . . Their positions may
be regulated completely by Congress. . . . We find no evidence that Congress
intended to make hearing examiners a class with lifetime employment, whether
there was work for them to do or not, as contended by the respondents. A reduction in force . . . and removal of an examiner in accordance therewith is a
"good cause" within the meaning of § 11.13A

It seems clear that the federal trial examiners are in no sense members of the federal judiciary, or even judges at all. They are simply
classified civil service employees with, however, an unusual freedom
from control by employer agencies. They do not have the security of
tenure that is given by Article III of the Constitution to some federal
judges; nor do they have even the security of tenure attributable, in
federal and state fields, to appointment or election for fixed terms.
They are subject to removal as Congress may direct. More to the
point, it also appears that to the extent that reductions in force are
subject to agency control or manipulation, to that extent trial examiners are subject to agency dismissal. They lack, therefore, in important particulars, the full independence of judges.
On the other hand, they are not mere agency employees. Their
powers when presiding at hearings come directly from the Administrative Procedure Act (Section 7), as do their powers in connection
with the decisional process (Section 8). They appear, therefore, to
be in a different, and more independent position than, for example,
masters in chancery or equivalent officers, whether under the name
of court commissioners, referees, or otherwise. The examiners are
13A Ibid.,

at 132 and 133.
The Section 7 powers seem clearly to be adequate to put the trial examiner in
full control of the hearing. In addition to the grant of general power to "regulate
the course of the hearing," Section 7 gives the following specific authorities: to administer oaths and affirmations; issue subpenas; rule on offers of proof and receive
evidence; take or cause depositions to be taken; hold conferences with the consent
of the parties for the settlement or simplification of issues; and dispose of'procedural
requests or similar matters. These things he can do on his own authority and without
any need for prior clearance or subsequent approval by the agency.
14
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not mere assistants or delegates of the agencies which they serve.
After presiding, the examiner is to make the initial or recommended
decision in the circumstances provided by Section 8, also on his own
authority."
The position of a federal trial examiner appears, therefore, to be
largely sui generis. He is more than a master or other assistant to a
judge, but, as was made clear in the Ramspeck case, he is less than a
judge.
Since he is not a judge, although he has decisional powers and
duties, and since he does not have the full independence of a judge,
it is quite important to examine carefully his civil service status; for
it is this status, rather than judicial status, that bears on the matter of
trial examiner independence. The examiner may be dependent, or independent, to the precise degree that-and regardless of merely general impressions on the matter-Section 11 and the civil service laws
and regulations permit him to be subject to agency pressures, or protect him from them. In the light of the Ramspeck case, how well was
the objective of trial examiner independence actually attained?
As already noted, the employing agencies do not have the power
to remove examiners, except as an incident to reduction in force procedures. But subservience might be coerced or induced in ways other
than by a threat of outright discharge. The matter of control over
promotion, or demotion, with attending salary adjustments, comes
immediately to mind as a powerful instrument of control over examiners.
On this matter, the trial examiners in the Ramspeck case took what
might be called the next to extreme position in favor of their independence. The extreme position would be that all trial examiners
were of one rank, like federal district judges for example, and that
no power existed anywhere to classify or grade the examiners. From
this it would follow that they would have maximum independence
because they would be immune from fear of demotion, and relieved
also from the temptation to be subservient in the hope of reward by
promotion.
The examiners did not take that extreme position, evidently being
mindful that they were subject, as provided in Section 11, to the Clas15 That the agency has plenary power of review over a trial examiner's decision,
as provided in Section 8 (a), does not in any way require qualification of the statement that the trial examiner can and should make his own decision on his own responsibility.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

sification Act; but they contended for the most limited application of
that Act. As stated by the Court, the examiners "did not contend that
all examiners should be classified in the same grade; they contend
only that all hearing examiners in any one agency should be classified
in the same grade." If the contention actually made by the examiners
were sustained two important results would follow: first, the Civil
Service Commission could classify or grade the examiners in view of
the differences in the work of the various agencies, so that less experienced and less able examiners might be assigned to agencies with
comparatively simple problems, while the higher grades of examiners
could be assigned to agencies whose work required greater experience
and ability. But, second, the examiners assigned to an agency would
all be of the same grade (regardless of the variation in difficulty of
agency problems), thereby immunizing all examiners serving a particular agency from the fear of being down-graded, or the hope of
promotion.
On the face of it, this contention seemed to be well within the
range of reason, having in mind the general objective of the Administrative Procedure Act to provide independent examiners; besides winning in the two courts below, the examiners also convinced a minority of three on the Supreme Court, namely Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas. Mr. Justice Black wrote:
The Administrative Procedure Act was designed to give trial examiners in
the various administrative agencies a new status of freedom from agency control. Henceforth they were to be "very nearly the equivalent of judges even
though operating within the Federal system of administrative justice." . . . In
fact, the Administrative Procedure Act appears to contemplate that all examiners employed by a particular agency stand on equal footing in regard to

service and pay.

The majority, however, took the contrary view. The reasoning of
the majority on this point seems to be something less than clearly
convincing. Without reviewing the reasoning in detail, it should be
pointed out that the majority made what seemed to be their strongest
point at the level of practicality, rather than as a strict matter of statutory interpretation. They pointed out that problems, even within a
single agency, vary in difficulty and in nature, and they appeared in
this matter to accept completely the contention by the Civil Service
Commission that:
Cases in a given agency are of varying levels of difficulty and importance and

that the examiners hearing them must possess varying degrees of competence
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and types of qualifications. Petitioners point to the experience of the Civil
Aeronautics Board where there are safety cases heard by one group of examiners and economic cases heard by another. The examiners assigned to the
safety cases have pilots' certificates, while those assigned to the economic cases
have completely different types of qualifications. Again, certain cases before
the Interstate Commerce Commission involve relatively simple applications for
extension of motor carrier certificates, while others involve complicated and
difficult rate proceedings.

From this point on, the majority seemed to conclude, rather than
demonstrate, that intra-agency stratification of examiners was not
only practically desirable but also that it was intended by Congress.
However practical it might be in the interest of economical and efficient utilization of examiner manpower to have a system of intraagency stratification, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended to have the most efficient system. However, the majority
found another bit of standing ground on the somewhat dubious basis
that "Congress must have recognized the right of the Commission to
so classify when it amended the Classification Act in 1949" without
disturbing the then prevailing situation whereby the "Commission
was classifying examiners under regulations similar to the present
ones."
But it is not our purpose to consider in detail the reasons for the
decision in the Ramspeck case, so much as it is to evaluate the results
of the decision. As a result of the decision the following situation
apparently exists: examiners of different grades may be assigned to a
single agency. The agencies lack not only power directly to dismiss
"unsatisfactory" examiners, but also lack power to control demotion
or promotion of examiners; furthermore cases are to be assigned to
examiners in rotation. Accordingly, in spite of lack of absolutely
secure tenure, and in spite of intra-agency grading of examiners, considerable examiner independence still seems to be provided for.
It is sometimes said that law is one thing and practice another. The
examiners contended in effect in the Ramspeck case that in practice
two loopholes existed to militate against maximum examiner objectivity and independence. First, as to the assignment of cases, not by
mere mechanical rotation among all the examiners, but by rotation
confined to examiners of equal qualifications or examiners of the same
grade, it would be possible for the agencies served by more than one
grade of examiners to exercise a very considerable discretion in the
assignment of cases to favored, or "favorable" examiners. As the
majority of the Court pointed out, the Civil Service Commission had
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adopted a classification which "ranged from just one grade in several
agencies to five grades in two agencies." Agency heads, and not the
Civil Service Commission, or other disinterested body, have the authority to assign cases to fit examiners, when more than one grade
of examiners serves the agency. The difficulty is due to the fact that
there is no clearly objective basis for judgment in the matching of
case difficulties to examiner qualifications. The bases for examiner
classification or grading are, as to job content, as follows: "moderately difficult and important;" "difficult and important;" "unusually
difficult and important;" "exceedingly difficult and important;" and
"exceptionally difficult and important." Indeed, the majority of the
Court admitted that these "specifications of necessity must be subjective." The minority asserted quite emphatically that "the distinctions depended upon to support the different classifications are
so nebulous that the head of an agency is left practically free to
select any examiner he chooses for any case he chooses."
We may test this quickly and practically. Just where does an ICC
rate proceeding fit into the five abovementioned categories? And
are all ICC rate cases of the same difficulty and importance? Without explicit answers to such questions, it is clear that the following
is possible: Examiner A is eligible for work of the "unusually difficult
and important" kind, and disposed to be "reasonable;" while Examiner B is eligible to preside at cases of the "exceedingly difficult and
important" kind, and quite capable of being "difficult" if he thinks
he ought to be. What can keep the agency from assigning the case
to A? This question is highly practical. In addition to agency success in getting a favorable examiner on the case, there is also the
point that if A gets all or many of the "important" cases, and B gets
none or few of them, their records when considered by the Civil
Service Commission are going to look very different. On the basis
of extended experience in important cases, A would appear to be a
candidate for promotion. Examiner B would not.
A weakness of the majority opinion is that it seems to give no
satisfactory assurance that such things could not and would not
happen. It does not indicate any way in which Examiner A can be
relieved of the temptation to continue in a course of "reasonable"
conduct, or in which Examiner B can be encouraged to continue
to be independent."0 Consequently, the result of the Rarnspeck deci16 The majority of the Court relied to some extent upon a kind of escape clause in

Section 11, namely the one in regard to assignment of cases to examiners in rotation
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sion on this point is that an agency can often so control the assignment of cases, when more than one class of examiners serves the
agency, as to tend to destroy much of the desired examiner independence. 7
Are there any other loopholes? Unfortunately, yes. Section 11
provides, as has been noticed, for appointment "by and for each
agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary." There is always the possibility of an increase in examiner force,
and the possibility of promotion within the existing force. Who will
be found "qualified and competent" to do the work in the higher
grades, if a vacancy exists, due to increase in the number of examinerships in those grades or to deaths, resignations, etc.? As the
majority of the Court pointed out, it is the Civil Service Commission, and not the agency, which chooses the particular examiner
who shall receive the promotion. But this is not the whole truth.
As the respondent examiners contended in the Ramspeck case,
the agency, in effect, has the power to punish any or all of its examiners, if it wishes; it has a veto power over all promotions, for it is
the agency which is to decide if a vacancy is to be filled, and if it is
to be filled by promotion. On the other hand, if the agency desires
to reward one or more, instead of punish, it has considerable room
for maneuver. It can defer decision that vacancies shall be created
or filled, and if so whether they are to be filled by promotion, until
embarrassing eligibles for promotion are gotten out of the way for
one reason or another, whether by death, resignation, transfer or
reduction in force. Then, a decision at an opportune time to create
or fill a vacancy, and to fill it by promotion, may as a practical mat"so far as practicable." In analyzing this highly ambiguous qualifying phrase the majority quite properly, as a matter merely of analysis, pointed out that it was "practicable" to assign cases not only by mechanical rotation among all the examiners
serving an agency, but also by rotation within groups of examiners of the same grade.
This does not, of course, meet the issue of encouragement or discouragement of examiners disposed to be independent.
17 The system of intra-agency grading of examiners is, of course, a more efficient
one. But if efficiency alone were desired, the system which existed before the Administrative Procedure Act could well have been continued. Under that system the
agency could assign cases to whatever examiners it wished, and the agency would
probably be in the best position to know the qualifications and abilities of its examiners-in fact in a better position than the Civil Service Commission is likely to be
under the present arrangement, removed as that Commission is from close, intimate,
contact with the day to day hearing and decisional problems within the particular
agencies. It is not without significance on the matter of maximum efficiency that
Congress abrogated, rather than perpetuated, the old trial examiner system.
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ter almost ensure that the desired examiner will be selected for the
position by the Civil Service Commission.
As to these matters, the fears of the respondent examiners were
disposed of by the majority of the Court as the imagining of "all
sorts of devious schemes by which the agencies shrewdly analyse
their staffs to pick out which examiners would probably be chosen
by the Commission for promotion, and then create vacancies for
them as a reward for favorable decisions." It is submitted that such
fears can well be founded on more than mere imagination. It would
be at the least a most naive idea that the agencies lack the shrewdness
to operate in the ways suggested. As to the point, made by the
majority, that the "Respondents have not shown any actual examples
of this," it need only be observed that such a point seems entirely
irrelevant. If it is possible for such things to happen, that possibility
should be taken into account. The majority did add that the respondent examiners did not show that "in such circumstances the
Commission would not correct the situation." On the other hand,
neither the Commission, nor the majority of the Court, showed that
the Commission could and would. At the moment, it does not in
fact appear that the Commission could correct such a situation. The
law does not prohibit the agencies from engaging in shrewd analyns,
nor does it seem to justify the Commission in rescinding any action
taken by it to promote an examiner merely because it belatedly
came to realize that it had been outmaneuvered by an agency.
But the main point is that it does not appear to be entirely fanciful
that such maneuvering might occur with sufficient frequency and
success to make many examiners keenly aware of the possibilities
of reward if they are sufficiently responsive to "practical" considerations which might affect their futures.
Against the above mentioned evils in the form of threats to complete examiner independence, there are two countervaling considerations which, at least, go far to support the majority decision. One
of these, the more economical and efficient use of examiner man
power, through a system of intra-agency grading of examiners, has
already been mentioned. It is obviously a consideration of the highest practical importance.
But there is another. Its importance appears to deserve pointed
mention, although neither the majority nor minority opinions referred to it. That importance can be indicated as follows: The work
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of many of the agencies is often highly specialized and complicated,
and it is desirable that examiners serving the agencies should have
specialized experience in the work of the particular agency served.
Congress, in fact, seemed clearly to recognize this. Nothing in Section 11 appears to provide for a general pool of trial examiners, members of which can be shifted from one agency to another on a
day to day or case to case basis. On the contrary, Section 11 provides that trial examiners shall be appointed "for" each agency. Accordingly, once an examiner is appointed for a particular agency he
can usually expect to stay with it.
But if all examiners of the agency were of the same grade, as advocated by the minority of the Court, there would be a certain
deadening effect upon examiner ambition that in the long run would
tend to be exceedingly expensive in the way of uninspired examiner
service to the public. Each examiner would be "at the top," and so
would have little incentive to improve himself and his capacity for
service. Under the pattern approved by the majority of the Court
the situation is vastly different. To an examiner appointed to the
lowest grade, there are several higher grades to which he can aspire.
The able and ambitious junior has a real incentive to work for promotion, and to do so under the theoretically superior condition, that
promotion will be on a merit basis, rather than the result of appointment through political favor.' 8 This, in itself, is a very wholesome condition. It is especially advantageous to the public interest
for the reason that the normal route to promotion should be by way
of superior service to the agency to which the examiner is assigned.
Such service in order to be superior would seem necessarily to involve an increasing mastery of the technical and special matters
within the jurisdiction of the agency served. There will tend to be,
therefore, a continuing competition for advancement between examiners serving an agency, rather than the opposite situation which
would tend to prevail if a deadening sameness of grade existed. It
is believed to be impossible to overestimate the long-run benefits
to the public interest in the feature of intra-agency competition.
Before arriving at any over-all conclusion about the decision in
the Ramspeck case, those interested in it would do well to keep the
point in mind that it would probably be a serious mistake (and per18 Without "getting into politics" or dwelling on the matter of federal judicial
appointments, it is well known that federal judges are overwhelmingly Democratic;
and it is fondly hoped by many Republicans that this condition will be "corrected."
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haps the majority of the Court accepted this view) to assume that
agency heads in general will strive significantly to exploit the weaknesses revealed in Section 11. While the scrutiny herein has been in
the nature of a somewhat suspicious search for evils possible under
Section 11, temperance in judgment seems to require that possibilities should be evaluated only as such, and not as probabilities or as
certainties. A safer assumption would seem to be one to the effect
that the agency heads in general will be disposed to comply with the
spirit of the section, that trial examiners by and large will be men
of reasonable integrity, and that the Civil Service Commission will
be reasonably alert to check or correct violations in particular cases.
At most, the weaknesses revealed in Section 11 do not appear to be
immediately and gravely alarming.
On the other hand, the results of the "practical" decision of the
Court, in regard to the ambiguities in Section 11, seem to be such
that the good might very reasonably be considered to far outweigh
the evil. The features of economical and efficient use of examiner
man power by a system of grading within agencies, and of active
competition in public service between examiners serving an agency
which employs examiners of different grades, are continuing and
permanent advantages of the highest importance."9 Not to be overlooked is the point that in spite of the weaknesses in the section, the
trial examiners nonetheless enjoy a very considerable, if not the
greatest possible, measure of independence.
Indeed, the solutions provided in the Ramspeck case appear, on the
whole, to be so felicitous, that if prophecy may be hazarded, the
prophecy is that it will probably be quite difficult to arouse any
vigorous and widespread action to undo the decision by amending
Section 11. There remains the matter of amending the section, not
to undo the decision, but to eliminate the evils which persist in
spite of it.
The matter involves a thorny, practical problem, in an important
area of government, and in such thorny matters it is usually not
possible to get solutions which are wholly beneficial, and completely
unmixed with undesirable features. The good results provided by
19 Whether it might even be desirable to extend features of the federal trial examiner system for use in court work is "another story," and so not to be gone into
here; it will be only suggested that there might be large public benefits from a system of judicial arrangements permitting judges to specialize in particular fields, and
requiring them to work under conditions where they would have the stimulus of
competition for advancement.
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the decision in the Ramspeck case should be preserved in any project
for amendment. That point need not be dwelt upon. The question
narrows, then, as to how Section 11 can be amended so as to eliminate
the evil without eliminating the good.
The evil centers in the situations of agency power to effect reductions in force, to evade in some degree the assignment of cases in
rotation, and to determine that vacancies in examinerships are to be
filled by promotion. As to the first, would it be sensible to vest in
some body, other than the agencies themselves, the power to decide
when examiner forces should be reduced? Who, better than the
agencies concerned, can know when and to what degree examiner
force should be reduced? As to the second, it simply does not appear to be possible to devise a scheme for the perfect matching of
cases, with their infinitely varying characters and complexities, to
the different grades of trial examiners, so as to eliminate all agency
discretion in the assignment of cases by a system of automatic rotation. As to the third, who better than the agencies concerned could
be depended upon to determine properly when vacancies in their
respective examiner forces should be filled by promotion?
A final thought on the matter is this: However reluctant one may
be to give up on the matter of improving the situation, it is very
hard to see how Congress could amend Section 11 to get any better
results than those provided by the Supreme Court in its "practical"
decision in the Ramspeck case.

